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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the axiomatic foundation of the revealed preference theory.
Many well-known results in literature rest upon the ability to choose over budget sets that
contains only 2 or 3 elements, the situations which are not observable in real life. In order
to give a more realistic approach, this paper shows that many of the famous consistency
requirements, such as those proposed by Arrow, Sen, Samuelson etc., are equivalent if the
domain of choice functions satisfy some set theoretical properties. And these properties,
unions and inclusions for example, are proposed in a way that gives observability.
1 Introduction
Revealed preference theory started off as an approach to explain consumers’
behaviors by the revealed preference through their actions (Samuelson 1938).
Defining preference relations on the bundles rather than specific goods, revealed
preference theoriests have been able to avoid notions such as marginal utilities,
and to construct a theory based only on a notion of preference. They also have
been trying to pin down necessary and sufficient conditions for the relations to
be rationalizable and the interlinks between the conditions. In Sen’s (1971) pa-
per "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference", the famous theorem that unites
many rationality conditions for a choice function has limitations on to what extent
we can believe in our assumptions or axioms. The dispute lies in the assumptions
on the domain of choice functions and it was first suggested by Arrow (1959).
The assumptions of choice function implied that the axioms on rationality (Sen
1971) should be trusted over all budgets of pairs and triplets, situations that are
unlikely to be observed. This leads to a philosophical problem. Despite the effort
in justifying the issue (Sen 1973), the theory remains unsatisfying for some (See
Suzumura 1976). Suzumura attempted in adopting a domain of choice functions
with no restriction, and his result was recognized as the more general result (Sen
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21997 pp.776). However, because no assumptions were made, the results were not
as strong and unifying.
In this paper, we seek to largely avoid the philosophical problems by changing
Arrow’s and Sen’s assumptions. Instead of adopting a domain of budgets that in-
cludes all the pairs and triplets, we would prove a result similar to Sen’s, based on
other general set theoretical properties of the domain and of the choice function.
The merit of the approach is to realize that the equivalency of the rationality
requirements rests on the more subtle set theoretical properties of the domain of
choice functions, other than the inclusion of all the pairs and triplets. Hence, we
hope this generalized version would enhance our confidence in consumer choice
theory because the requirements of previously mentioned properties would be
much observable in real life, and hence that concerns about the extent of belief
in the axioms would be dispelled.
2 Notations and Definitions.
This paper, we will adopt the following notations. Consider X 6= ∅ as the set
of all bundles, the choice function C(.) is defined on a nonempty subset of the
powerset of X, B, called the set of budgets. For any budget B ∈ B, we require
that C(B) ⊂ B and C(B) is not empty, so ∅ /∈ B (i.e. the empty set cannot
be a budget set). Throughout the paper, we use the symbol ¬ for mathematical
negation.
Based on the choice function, the following definitions for a relation on X have
been much discussed in the literature. For the first ones, we should interpret re-
lations R as “at least as good as”, P as “strictly preferred to”.
Definition 1 For any x, y ∈ X, xRy if and only if ∃B ∈ B such that x ∈ C(B)
and y ∈ B.
Definition 2 For any x, y ∈ X, xPy if and only if xRy and ¬yRx.
3Another definition for a relation was given by Arrow’s (1959) "revealed pref-
erence". It was denoted as P˜ .
Definition 3 For any x, y ∈ X, xP˜y if and only if ∃B ∈ B such that x ∈ C(B)
and y ∈ B − C(B).
Definition 4 For any x, y ∈ X, xR˜y if and only if ¬yP˜x.
Other than the above definitions, there are also some notations about the
“wide sense” relations, or, the “transitive closures” of R and P˜ defined as follows
(Ritchter 1966):
Definition 5 For any x, y ∈ X, n ∈ N+, xWy if and only if there exists a
sequence of x1, x2, . . . , xn such that x1 = x, xn = y and xi−1Rxi.
Definition 6 For any x, y ∈ X, n ∈ N+, xV˜ y if and only if there exists a
sequence of x1, x2, . . . , xn such that x1 = x, xn = y and xi−1P˜ xi.
Given that we have the above definitions on relations, we can start stating
definitions and axioms on rationality and consistency.
Definition 7 a choice function C(.) is normal if and only if ∀B ∈ B, C(B) =
{x ∈ B|xRy ∀y ∈ B}.
Definition 8 a binary relation on X is called an ordering if and only if it is
transitive and complete (or some author referrs to as connected).
If a choice function is normal with respect to some ordering R, we say C(.) is
rational or rationalizable.
Definition 9 A choice function is said to satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP, Samuelson 1938) if for every x, y ∈ X: xP˜y ⇒ ¬yRx (or
equivalently yRx⇒ ¬xP˜y).
4Definition 10 A choice function is said to satisfy the Strong Axiom of Revealed
Preference (SARP, Houthakker 1950) if for every x, y ∈ X: xV˜ y ⇒ ¬yRx.
Definition 11 A choice function is said to satisfy the Weak Congruence Ax-
iom (WCA, Sen 1971) if for every x, y ∈ X: suppose xRy, then for any B ∈ B,
(x ∈ B and y ∈ C(B) )⇒ x ∈ C(B).
Definition 12 A choice function is said to satisfy the Strong Congruence Ax-
iom (SCA, Richter 1966) if for every x, y ∈ X: suppose xWy, then for any
B ∈ B, (x ∈ B and y ∈ C(B) )⇒ x ∈ C(B).
3 Motivation
We hope that, from proving the results, we would be able to prove Sen’s uni-
fication theorem (1971) as an direct application. Therefore we want to capture
the essence of Sen’s assumption. Sen included in B all the budgets with exactly
2 elements in order to compare each pair, and all the budgets with exactly 3 ele-
ments in order to avoid cycles. This suggests that first, if we are able to compare
each two elements of X, not necessarily in a pair but in any sets, then we should
be able to achieve completeness. Secondly, if we are also able to avoid cycles by
choosing from more than 3 bundles, we should be able to reach a satisfying result.
To compare every two bundles a and b, it would be intuitive that when a is
chosen from the set A, and b is chosen from the set B, then we would have im-
plicitly compared a and b by choosing from the set A∪B. Similarly, for a, b and
c, we can try to choose from the set A ∪ B ∪ C. This seems promising because
if one let the domain B to include all the singletons, then every element should
be chosen in some singleton (by the assumption that C(.) is never the empty
set). Now by including the union of 2 or 3 singletons into the domain of C(.), we
would have included all the pairs and triplets and Sen’s theorem can be proved.
As it turns out, this union condition is almost enough, but not sufficient as will
be seen in Theorem 2.
5In the context of consumer theory, the benefit of the union condition is that it
seems more plausible than requiring all the pairs and triplets. The usual setting
is that given disposible income I and the price Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n of n number of
goods in the market, the consumer is facing a polyhedron shape budget under
the constraint of
∑n
i=1 PiQi = I, where Qi is the quantity of the ith goods. Here,
the union of budget sets would become some concave polyhedra, which can be
observed in price cut or whole sale situations.
4 Construction and Main Results
Under the above motivation, we make the following assumption on B as below:
Assumption 1 For any domain B for a choice function C(.), there exists B1 ⊆ B
such that B3 = {B1 ∪ B2 ∪ B3|B1, B2, B3 ∈ B1} ⊆ B; moreover, for any bundle
x ∈ X, there exists a budget Bx ∈ B1 such that x ∈ C(Bx).
Theorem 1. Supposed C(.) is defined on B and Assumption 1 is satisfied, then
the following are equivalent:
(i) C(.) satisfies Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference;
(ii) C(.) satisfies Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference;
(iii) R is an ordering and C(.) is normal;
(iv) C(.) satisfies Strong Congruence Axiom;
(v) C(.) satisfies Weak Congruence Axiom;
(vi) R=R˜;
In the proof of theorem 1, we make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the WARP holds. Suppose that x ∈ C(Bx), y ∈ C(By)
for some budget sets Bx, By ∈ B. If Bx ∪ By ∈ B, then at least one of x or y
belongs to C(Bx ∪By).
6There are two equivalent conditions in Sen’s 1971 paper that are not covered
by theorem 1 because they do not fit in the context. They will be covered in the
next result together with some other rationality conditions. However, additional
definitions and notations are necessary. In order to be consistent with the moti-
vation and the previous discussion, we mimic Uzawa (1956) and Arrow’s (1959)
definition of a relation "generated by comparison over all pairs" to be noted by R:
Definition 13 For any x, y ∈ X, xRy if and only if there exists Bx, By ∈ B1
such that x ∈ C(Bx), y ∈ C(By) and x ∈ C(Bx ∪By).
Additionally, in the following generalization, we require some additional as-
sumptions on a proper subset of B and the choice function C(.) for some of the
definitions to be meaningful or applicable.
Assumption 2 Finiteness: for each B ∈ B, the number of elements in B is
finite.
Assumption 3 Pre-rationality: ∀Bx, By ∈ B1, C(Bx ∪By) ⊆ C(Bx) ∪ C(By).
Assumption 4 Closed Under Finite Union: if A,B ∈ B, then A ∪B ∈ B.
Lemma 2. Assumption 3 is satisfied if and only if for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Bi ∈ B,
then
⋃n
i=1Bi ∈ B.
It can be seen that all the above assumptions can be implied from assuming
that B consists of all finite subsets of X. In particular, Assumption 2 and 3
are required for the following consistency requirement to be meaningful in the
context.
Axiom of Sequential Path Independence was a rationality condition originally
proposed by Bandyopadhyay (1988). The idea was that if a choice function is
rational, it should be necessary and sufficient that comparing each two bundles
in a budget in different orders would give the same final choice. In order to fit
in the above settings, we would use the following notations to give a modified
version. For all B ∈ B, let Ω(B) be the set of all permutations of elements of B,
and |B| denote the cardinality of B. Let Br denote some budget in B1 such that
r ∈ C(Br). Suppose assumption 2 holds, for any choice function C(.) and any
ω ∈ Ω(B), define the following sets recursively:
71. ωˆ(1) = {ω(1)}
2. For any positive integer i ≤ |B|, ωˆ(i+ 1) = B ∩⋃a∈ωˆ(i)C(Ba ∪Bω(i+1)) for
any Ba, Bω(i) ∈ B1.
Definition 14 If assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied, a choice function C(.) is said
to satisfy the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence (ASPI, Bandyopadhyay
1988) if for any B ∈ B and for all ω ∈ Ω(B), C(B) = ωˆ(|B|).
We have moderately adjusted the original notation. For any ω ∈ Ω(B), ωˆ(i)
can be interpreted as the ith ω estimate for what is chosen from B. It is clear that
purpose of having finiteness is so that the above version of Axiom of Sequential
Path Independence adapted from Bandyopadhyay (1988) would fit in the con-
text. Even though we require finiteness, this is very different from requiring B3
including all the pairs and triplets. In fact, these finite numbers can be of huge
scale so that the condition does little harm in terms of realizability. In other
words, the number of bundles in B ∈ B can be large enough to fill in a budget
polyhedron of infinite many bundles in a way that a consumer cannot distinguish
between choosing from each one of them. Assumption 3 is a restriction for the
choice function on a proper subset of B, which in itself is in some sense a weak
consistency requirement. It is critical for determining what is chosen given the
choice function satisfies ASPI. If put back into the original context where all pairs
and triplets are included in the domain of the choice function and take all Bx to
be sinigleton {x}, then the definition above gives the same meaning as those in
Bandyopadhyay’s (1988) paper.
Another consistency condition first given by Arrow (1959) is modified as below:
Definition 15 If assumption 4 is satisfied, a choice function C(.) is said to satisfy
the Arrow’s Condition if for any A,B ∈ B, when A ⊆ B and A∩C(B) 6= ∅, then
C(A) = C(B) ∩ A.
In Arrow’s (1959) formulation, if we want to derive rationalizability from Ar-
row’s Condition, it would heavily rely on the domain of choice function consisting
of all finite subsets of X. Because for Arrow’s Condition to be meaningful, for
8any A ∈ B, there needs to be a proper superset or proper subset of A, and the
intersection of their chosen elements is not empty. In the following result, we see
that if B is closed under finite union, then Arrow’s Condition is also equivalent
to C(.) being rational.
Theorem 2. Supposed C(.) is defined on B and Assumption 1 is satisfied, then
the following are equivalent:
(i) R is an ordering and C(.) is normal;
(ii) R is an ordering and C(B) = {x ∈ B|xRb ∀b ∈ B};
(iii) R = R˜ and C(B) = {x ∈ B|xRb ∀b ∈ B};
(iv) C(.) satisfies Axiom of Sequential Path Independence.
(v) C(.) satisfies Arrow’s Condition;
Remark 1. (ii), (iii) are modified from Sen’s (1971) formulations “R is an order-
ing, C(.) is normal” and “R = R˜ and C(.) is normal”. But they are respectively
equivalent if the domain of choice function consists of all finite subsets of X. To
see this, (ii), (iii) imply the corresponding formulations because they imply (i).
And if B1 is all the singletons, then nomality would give R = R when considering
choosing over the pairs. So they are respectively equivalent statements.
The above assumptions is enough to prove Sen’s (1971) classic result, because
it can be verified that choice functions defined on all pairs and triplets is a model
of the theories in this paper. When every element Bx ∈ B1 is a singleton x, then
obviously all of our assumptions are satisfied and all budgets of pairs and triplets
are in B3 ⊆ B, hence theorems 1 and 2 together give the desired equivalencies.
Sen′s Corollary : Suppose B consists of all finite budgets, then all the equiva-
lent conditions in theorem 1 and 2 are equivalent.
Moreover, it can also be seen that this is not the only model for the theory.
There are many different models, for the purpose of this paper, we would consider
the following model in the context of consumer theory:
9Example1 : Let X = {a, b, c, d}, B1 = {{a, b, d}, {b, c, d}, {a, c, d}, {d}}. Let
B = B3. So Assumptions 2, 4 are satisfied. If Assumptions 1 and 3 are also sat-
isfied, then all the above equivalencies hold. For example, for any C(.) such that
a ∈ C({a, b, d}), b ∈ C({b, c, d}), c ∈ C({a, c, d}), {d} = C({d}), Assumption 1
would force one to choose from {a, b, c, d} = X. If one of a, b, c is chosen from X,
then WARP would force this chosen one to be the chosen in every budget, and
so R would be an ordering. If, on the other hand, d is chose, then WARP forces
everything to be chosen at every budgets, so R is also an ordering.
Example2 : Fix a positive integer n, let X = Nn be the n-cartesian product of
natural numbers. Fix the price vector (p1, p2, . . . , pn) ∈ (R+)n. Let B1 consists
of the budgets of the form {(q1, q2, . . . , qn) |qi ∈ N,
∑n
i=1 piqi ≤ I} for any I such
that mini{pi} ≤ I. I.e. B1 is the set of so called budget triangles. Let B be the
smallest superset of B1 that is closed under finite union and intersection. Define
the choice function C(.) restricted on B3 to be for every B ∈ B3,
C(B) = {(q1, q2, . . . , qn) ∈ B|
n∏
i=1
qi ≥
n∏
i=1
q′i, ∀
(
q′1, q
′
2, . . . , q
′
n
) ∈ B}
It can be checked that all Assumptions 1 to 4 are satisfied. So theorems 1 and
2 ensure that the rationality conditions discussed are equivalent.
5 Discussion
We extend the equivalence results in Sen (1971) by allowing more flexibility
in assumptions. In terms of the proofs given, some of them are similar to what
there were in the literature because in some directions, no specific assumptions
on the domain of choice functions are needed. However, in the other directions it
is necessarily to check that the equivalencies still holds under the above settings.
In particular, some proves are more technical then the original ones. It is as
Arrow (1959) who first suggested that “the demand-function point of view would
be greatly simplified if the range over which the choice functions are considered
to be determined is brodened to include all finite sets”.
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However, there is a need to derive the theory based on some more observ-
able assumptions. Resuming the discussion in Sen (1973) and Suzumura (1976),
admittedly, no matter how general our theorems are, all the above conditions
and axioms can never be verified, as there can be only finitely many data and
situations are uncountably infinite. But this is a constraint of verifiability for all
scientific theories, not limited to economics. And this is also the reason for theo-
rizing, trying to give the simplest assumptions to explain and predict effectively
in situations that are similar, but not exactly the same as those happened previ-
ously (Hempel, et al. 1948). Axioms and assumptions should also be abstraction
of the physical world and be based on observable events and objects. Aligned
with this perspective, it could be problematic if scope of our assumptions is not
restricted to the more realizable circumstances. One of the examples was that
the mathematical "axiom of choice" was intuitively true in considering only finite
sets (so it is not called an axiom in this situation), but if it is believed to be true
for arbitrary sets, many pathological objects arise (See Dudley 1989i). In addi-
tion, even if we do believe our conditions of choice functions to hold in the less
realizable situations, it would be unsatisfying and problematic if the theorems
have to be proven based on unrealistic assumptions that are made for the proof
to work. In terms of the rationality conditions, our paper says they do not. In
general, if it is possible to achieve the same theories basing on more realizable
constructions, while the results are not invalidated by data, we can be more con-
fident and certain about the implications of the theory.
Given that the theories can be tested in realizable situations, future research
can be conducted on how the theories can be interpreted in heuristic documents,
and whether the empirical data admits the consistency conditions.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose for contradiction, x, y /∈ C(Bx∪By). Then by property of choice
function, ∃z ∈ C(Bx∪By). Without loss of generality, suppose z ∈ Bx. Then by
definition, we have zP˜x. Since we also have xRz, this contradicts WARP.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Theorem 1 will be proven in the following fashion (“ ∗⇒” indicates the proof
requires Assumption 1 on B):
(ii)
∗⇒ (iii)⇒ (vi)⇒ (ii)
(ii)
∗⇒ (iii)⇒ (iv)⇒ (v)⇒ (ii)
(ii)
∗⇒ (iii)⇒ (i)⇒ (ii)
(ii)
∗⇒ (iii): Suppose WARP holds, we want to show: 1,C(.) is normal; 2, R is
a complete binary relation; 3, R is transitive.
To show 1, on one hand, x ∈ C(B) ⇒ xRy for every y ∈ B. Therefore x ∈
{x ∈ B|∀y ∈ B, xRy}. On the other hand, x ∈ {x ∈ B|∀y ∈ B, xRy} ⇒ ¬yP˜x
for any y ∈ B by WARP. If x /∈ C(B), then zP˜x for some z ∈ C(B) leads to a
contradiction. Hence C(.) is normal.
To show 2, suppose x, y ∈ X, then there exists Bx, By ∈ B1 such that
x ∈ C(Bx), y ∈ C(By). By Lemma 1, we have x or y belonging to C(Bx ∪ By).
So we have xRy or yRx.
To show 3, suppose xRy and yRz. By construction, we can consider the
budgets Bx, By, Bz ∈ B1 such that
r ∈ C(Br) ∀r ∈ {x, y, z}
Let B = Bx ∪ By ∪ Bz ∈ B3 ⊆ B, lemma 1 implies either x, y or z ∈ C(B). In
the view of WARP, z ∈ C(B) ⇒ y ∈ C(B) and y ∈ C(B) ⇒ x ∈ C(B). So we
must have xRz.
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(iii)⇒ (vi): R is an ordering and C(.) is normal, we want to show R = R˜.
Suppose xR˜y, so ¬yP˜x. We know R is complete. So we have either yRx or
xRy or both. So ¬yP˜x implies we must have xRy.
Suppose xRy, by the normality of C(.), whenever x, y ∈ B and y ∈ C(B), we
must have x ∈ C(B) by transitivity of R. So it is impossible that yP˜x. Hence
we have xR˜y.
(vi)⇒ (ii):
xRy ⇒ xR˜y ⇒ ¬yP˜x.
(iii)⇒ (iv): AssumingR is an ordering and C(.) is normal, we want to show SCA.
Suppose we have x1Rx2R . . . Rxn, and for some B ∈ B we have x1, xn ∈ B
and xn ∈ C(B). R being an ordering implies x1Rxn. xn ∈ C(B) and C(.) is
normal implies ∀z ∈ B, xnRz. Therefore x1Rz by transitivity and x1 ∈ C(B)
by normality.
(iv)⇒ (v): (trivial).
(v)⇒ (ii): want to show WCA ⇒ WARP.
Suppose xRy, by WCA: ∀B ∈ B, if x, y ∈ B and y ∈ C(B), then x ∈ C(B).
So it is impossible that yP˜x. Hence WCA ⇒ WARP.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Assuming R is an ordering and C(.) is normal, we want to show
SARP.
Suppose x1P˜ x2 . . . P˜ xn, by transitivity of R, we have x1Rxn. Now suppose
for contradiction, xnRx1, then transitivity implies xiRxj for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
In particular, x2Rx1. Now, by (iii)⇒ (vi) we have R = R˜. Hence x2R˜x1 which
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contradicts x1P˜ x2.
(i)⇒ (ii): (trivial).
The above completes the proof.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Trivial.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 2
When it is clear from the context, we will write Bx for the some budget in B1
where x is chosen. The result will be proven in the following sequence (The “∗”
on the arrow shows when Assumption 1 is used).
(i)
∗⇒ (iv) ∗⇒ (i)
(i)⇒ (v) ∗⇒ (i)
(i)
∗⇒ (iii) ∗⇒ (ii) ∗⇒ (i)
Proof.
(i)
∗⇒ (iv): this proof is adapeted from the one given by Bandyopadhyay.
Let R be an ordering and C(.) be normal. Therefore x ∈ C(B) ⇒ xRb ∀b ∈
B. Choose an arbitrary ω ∈ Ω(B) and that ω(i) = x, then ωˆ(i) = B ∩⋃
a∈ωˆ(i−1)C(Ba ∪ Bx). By R being an ordering and C(.) is normal, we have
x ∈ ωˆ(i). Similarly, we see that x ∈ ωˆ(j) for every j ≥ i. So C(B) ⊆ ωˆ(|B|).
Now suppose x /∈ C(B), then ∀y ∈ C(B) transitivity and normality implies
yPx. Moreover, normality ensures that x /∈ C(B) if and only if yPx. So it fol-
lows that ω(i) = y ⇒ x /∈ ωˆ(i). Similar reasoning gives x /∈ ωˆ(j) ∀j ≥ i. Hence
x /∈ ωˆ(|B|) and C(B) ⊇ ωˆ(|B|).
(iv)
∗⇒ (i):given that ASPI holds, try to show WCA, then by Theorem 1, the
claim is proven.
14
In order to show WCA, suppose xRy, and for some B ∈ B there is x ∈ B,
y ∈ C(B), we will try to show x ∈ C(B).
xRy ⇒ ∃A ∈ B such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A. But by ASPI, this
means ¬ (∃a ∈ A such that for some Ba ∈ B1, x /∈ C(Ba ∪Bx) ∀Bx ∈ B1). Be-
cause otherwise by letting ω(|A|) = a, assumption 3 gives that x /∈ ωˆ(|A|). In
other words, ∀a ∈ A,∀Ba ∈ B1,∃Bx ∈ B1 such that x ∈ C(Bx ∪Ba); in particu-
lar, x ∈ C(By ∪Bx).
Similarly, by hypothesis y ∈ C(B), if b ∈ B, then ∀Bb ∈ B1,∃By ∈ B1 y ∈
C(Bb ∪By). So choose ω ∈ Ω(B) such that y = ω(|B| − 1), x = ω(|B|). Then we
have y ∈ ωˆ(|B| − 1). By the previous paragraph, we can choose By, Bx ∈ B1 so
that x ∈ C(By ∪Bx) and hence x ∈ ωˆ(|B|) = C(B).
(i)⇒(v): assuming R is an ordering and C(.) is normal, we want to prove AC.
Suppose A,B ∈ B3, A ⊂ B and A∩C(B) 6= ∅. By normality and ordering, it
is obvious that C(A) ⊃ C(B) ∩ A.
Now suppose y ∈ C(A) and a ∈ A∩C(B). C(.) is normal implies aRx ∀x ∈ B
and yRa. Now transitivity implies yRx ∀x ∈ B. So normality gives y ∈ C(B)
and C(A) ⊂ C(B) ∩ A.
(v)
∗⇒ (i): Assuming Arrow’s Condition, we want to show Weak Congruence
Axiom, and by theorem 1 (where the “∗” is used) we have (i).
Let xRy and y ∈ C(B), x ∈ B for some B ∈ B, we want to show x ∈ C(B).
Let A ∈ B such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A. Consider C(A ∪ B). If
C(A ∪ B) ∩ A = ∅, then it is necessary that C(A ∪ B) ∩ B 6= ∅ and so C(B) =
C(A∪B)∩B. But y ∈ C(B), so y ∈ C(A∪B) and y ∈ A, which a contradiction.
Hence we have to have C(A ∪ B) ∩ A 6= ∅. Then x ∈ C(A) = C(A ∪ B) ∩ A.
Because x ∈ B, so x ∈ C(B) = C(A ∪B) ∩B.
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(i)
∗⇒ (iii): it suffices to show R = R˜ = R.
xRy ⇒ xRy. Since R is an ordering and C(.) is normal, theorem 1 says WARP
holds. Therefore xRy ⇒ ¬yP˜x and hence xR˜y.
xR˜y ⇒ ¬yP˜x. Because R is an ordering and C(.) is normal, we must have
x or y ∈ C(Bx ∪By). So ¬yP˜x⇒ xRy. Therefore R = R˜.
xRy ⇒ xRy by definition. For the other direction, suppose xRy, normality
and transitivity implies x ∈ C(Bx ∪By). Hence xRy.
(iii)
∗⇒ (ii): it suffices to show that R is an ordering.
To show R is complete, suppose x, y /∈ C(Bx ∪ By) for contradiction. Let
z ∈ C(Bx ∪By). Since x ∈ C(Bx), we have ∀a ∈ Bx, xRa and hence ¬aP˜x. But
zP˜x, so z /∈ Bx, similarly, z /∈ By, which is impossible. So R is complete. This ar-
gument also shows that for any Ba, Bb, Bc ∈ B1, either a, b or c ∈ C(Ba∪Bb∪Bc).
For transitivity, suppose xRy, yRz. It follws that xR˜y, yR˜z and ¬yP˜x, ¬zP˜ y.
It follows from the above argument that we must have x ∈ C(Bx ∪ By ∪ Bz).
Therefore ∀t ∈ Bx ∪By ∪Bz, xRt. So we have xRz as desired.
(ii)
∗⇒ (i): It suffices to show that R = R.
xRy ⇒ xRy by definition. Suppose xRy, then ∃B ∈ B such that y ∈ B,
x ∈ C(B). So xRy.
This completes the proof.
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